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Abstract
There are important differences among former communist countries in performance of their
agricultural sectors that are commonly attributed to variation in inherent institutions and reform
policy choices. In this paper the link between institutions, reforms and (labour) productivity growth
in agriculture is analysed within an augmented neo-classical growth model framework derived from
a production function. For the empirical analysis panel data over the transition period (1990-2001)
were used that cover IS former communist countries, applying a GMM-IV estimator. Estimation results
strongly support the view that the shift to individual land use, measuring farm restructuring, as well as
the overall economic reforms, supported by democratic institutions, have positively contributed to the
(labour) productivity growth in former communist countries' agriculture.
Additional keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, individual farming, transition
Introduction
This paper examines the factors behind the differences among IS former communist
countries in performance of their agricultural sectors'! Various studies have shown
that the distortions imposed in the past by the planned economy, with respect to type
of prevailing institutions, ownership, and management of land have weighed heavily
during the first decade of transition [see Rozelle & Swinnen (2004) for an overview
of relevant studies]. Policies to eliminate these distortions have been implemented at
a varying pace, often because of opposition by vested interests and groups fearing the
loss of employment and access to subsidized resources. This has resulted in substantial
differences among countries in output and productivity growth.
The progress in agricultural reform has been strongly associated with progress
in general economic reform (Anon., 2002). Such progress has in turn been closely
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Table 1. Indicators of reform, farm restructuring and agricultural performance over the period 1990-2001 for 15 former communist countries.
Region Country Performance Farm restructuring indicator Reform indicatorzc... indicator!i');
U"1
U"1
.:.. GAOW2 GAO 2 ITAL" ITAL Transfer- WB ECA2 Procedure 4 EBRD 2
'" pre-reform ability 30 20000co
Central Europe Czech Rep. 171 78 I 26 L, BS 9.2 R 3.5 8
Hungary 23 8 77 13 51 L, BS 9.2 R 3·75
Poland 91 92 76 84 L, BS 8.0 I 3.5 8
Slovakia 132 66 2 9 L, BS 8.2 R 3.42
Balkans Albania 1I05 1I65 3 9 05 L, BS 7.6 DP 2·75
Bulgaria 62 6 67 6 14 566 L, BS 8.0 R 3.04
Romania 79 91 14 85 L, BS 7·4 R 2.9 2
Slovenia 1I3 1I8 83 94 L, BS 9.2 I 3.29
Baltic States Estonia 135 49 4 61 L, BS 9.0 R 3·54
Latvia 66 39 4 89 L, BS 9.0 R 3.17
Lithuania 76 69 9 87 L, BS 8.0 R 3·33
Commonwealth Belarus 83 59 7 14 URNT, BSP 1.8 DS 1.63
of Independent Kazakhstan 726 566 0 24 5 URT, BSP 5.8 DS 2·79
States Russia 69 64 2 13 5 L, BSP 5.8 DS 2.63
Ukraine 58 58 6 185 L, BSP 6.0 DS 2.5 8
! Cumulative indices in 2001 (1990 ~ lOO).
2 GAOW ~ gross agricultural output per worker; GAO ~ gross agricultural output; ITAL ~ share of total agricultural land used for individual farms; WB ECA ~ progress
index ofland reform in 2001; EB RD ~ progress index of general economic reform in 2001.
L, BS ~ leasing; buy-and-sell; URNT, BSP ~ user rights non-transferable, buy-and-sell of private plots problematic; URT, BSP ~user rights transferable, buy-and-sell of
private plots problematic; L, BSP ~ leasing, buy-and-sell problematic.
4 Dominant form. R ~ restitution; I ~ individual pre-I990; DP ~ distribution of plots; DS ~ distribution of shares.
5 Data for 1998.
6 Data for 1999.
Sources: EBRD, FAO, ILO, World Bank and national statistics offices.
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associated with more democratic and competitive political systems and institutions. As
a result, the more successful agricultural reformers have been the Central European
countries (CEq. By contrast, in many of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States
(CIS) major institutional and policy hurdles to improving the performance of the sector
have long remained. There is evidence suggesting that improving the performance of
the agricultural sector requires adoption ofpolicies that can boost productivity through
restructuring and investment (Lerman et a!., 2004). But for that to happen, greater clarity
concerning title to land and the facilitation ofa better functioning land and inputs market
are required. The reforms most relevant to agriculture have included price and trade
liberalization, land reform, farm restructuring and individualization of agricultural land
use, privatization of input supply and agro-processing, and changes in rural finance.
Table I summarizes indicators of progress in reforms among IS former communist
countries. It is evident that progress has varied widely but that a number of patterns
emerge. Progress in general economic reform and progress in agricultural reform are
highly correlated. Consequently, the more advanced reformers are mostly found among
the CEC and the Baltic States. In the CIS, general economic reform, including price
liberalization has proceeded more slowly. The differences in implementation across the
range of reforms have been characteristic of the intermediate and late reformers. For
example, in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine implementation ofland reform
and institutional change has lagged behind.
Table I also shows that there have been major differences among the IS countries
in the methods by which land has changed ownership. Restitution of farmland to
former owners has been the most common land reform process in the CEC, Balkans,
and Baltic States except for Poland, Albania and Slovenia.2 Typically, in most countries
the reform laws have specified that land had to be restituted to former owners, using
historical boundaries, if possible. If not, former owners have been entitled to a plot
ofland of comparable size and quality. Most CIS countries, including Russia and
Ukraine, have distributed collective and state farmland equally among collective
farm members or state farm employees in the form of paper shares or certificates.3
In Belarus and Kazakhstan, however, only private ownership of household plots has
been permitted. Physical distribution of farmland to farm workers or rural households
on an equal per capita basis occurred in Albania and partly in Hungary and Romania
(Lerman et a!., 2004). This variation in the features ofland reform can be largely
attributed to initial conditions and institutional specificities, such as the length of time
since the land was nationalized and the ethnicity and equality ofland ownership before
collectivization.
The tradability ofland or ability to transfer land has also varied substantially. In
the countries with advanced land reform, rights to buy and sell, as well as leasing, have
been universally implemented. Nevertheless, there remains - even within this group
- significant variation in the share ofland held by individuals. The break-up ofcollective
farms into individual farms has taken place in very different ways and resulted in a
diverse picture within groups ofcountries that are otherwise homogeneous with respect
to success in the transition process. In Albania, for example, there was a complete
break-up of the collective farms, whereas in Kazakhstan and Slovakia the share ofland
used by individual farms remained small. At present, the former communist countries
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commonly have a mix of farm organizations, such as private co-operative farms, joint-
stock companies, family farms and part-time farmers (e.g., Rizov, 200sa).
Despite the diverse outcomes there has been a relatively uniform strategy of
agricultural transition aimed to improve efficiency and productivity by replacing the
institutional and organizational features of the command economy with attributes
borrowed from the practice of market economies (Lerman, 1999). The ideal transition
agenda formulated in the early 1990S - mostly on economic grounds - envisaged a
shift from collective to more efficient individualized land use as the ultimate goal.
Individual land use was expected to allow farmers, once established as independent
entities, to engage in land-market transactions and optimize the size of the holdings
given their managerial skills and availability of resources (e.g., Deininger, 1995;
Lerman, 1998; Rizov, 2003). This process was expected to increase efficiency and
productivity, and ultimately result in growth of incomes. Thus one could hypothesize
- given necessary economic reform being implemented - that individualization ofland
use would positively influence agricultural productivity because of the higher efficiency
of the individual family farm organization. Besides, individualization could also have
an indirect effect on agricultural productivity growth, resulting from the more efficient
reallocation of resources among farm organizations.
In this paper this hypothesis is empirically tested within a neo-classical growth
model framework following Rizov (200Sb). This approach avoids criticisms on the
grounds of lack of theoretical and objective criteria for including various explanatory
variables and controls for unobserved country-specific effects and endogeneity of the
reform variables.4 The present analysis is an extension of Rizov (200Sb), explicitly
discussing the links between inherent institutions and reform policy choices.
Furthermore, additional policy variables are used in the econometric analysis. The
estimation results are robust to various timing assumptions and support the view that
the shift to individual land use has positively contributed to the (labour) productivity
growth in the agricultural sectors of former communist countries. It is also concluded
that the effect of initial conditions and institutions manifests through the impacts
of individualized land use and general economic reforms. So the effect of inherent
institutions on agricultural (labour) productivity growth is only indirect.
Institutions and agricultural reform policies
In this chapter the relationships between inherent institutions and the evolution of
agricultural reform policies is investigated.5 It has been argued by several authors
(e.g., Lerman et a!., 2004; Rizov, 200Sb) that individualization of agricultural
production has had significant impact on productivity growth. Clearly, at the heart
of agricultural reform and farm restructuring is the issue of land ownership and
land use. The critical policy decision has been whether to pursue restitution ofland
to previous owners, or distribution to collective farm workers. This policy choice
has in part been driven by institutional factors such as the history of private land
ownership, concentration of ownership prior to collectivization, and the number of
years under communism. Private land ownership was a well-established institution in
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the CEC and Balkans, and legal ownership rights remained in force even during the
Communist period. For these countries the question was not whether to restitute land
to legal owners, but how, since the political cost of not restituting land and property
was higher than the cost involved in breaking up the co-operative farms (Swinnen,
1999). In countries where land ownership before collectivization was highly unequal,
the choice involved was deciding what value should be attached to considerations of
historical justice as against current equity. Moreover, privatization - either through
straight restitution, distribution, or a combination of the two - could be managed in
such a way to rebalance land holdings among different social groups, i.e., foreigners
as against nationals or members of a dominant ethnic group as against a minority.
Finally, in countries where over several generations communist attitudes towards the
land had taken firmer root, the demand for private land ownership was weaker, and
this contributed to the choice of share distribution or limited use rights rather than
distribution ofland plots.
Here we argue that the choices of reform policies were predetermined by
inherent institutions. Consequently, the choices about the way in which the land
reform was to be implemented in the early stages of transition have generated their
own dynamics. Privatization through land share issues - as in Kazakhstan, Russia,
and Ukraine - has tended to strengthen vested interest groups opposed to further
land reform. Uncertainties over title and the high transaction costs associated with
starting independent farms have reduced incentives for rural entrepreneurs to leave
the incompletely privatized collective farms. In the absence of enforceable ownership
rights and a law on mortgages, credit has been largely unavailable to independent
farmers, which in turn has fed a preference for maintaining under-priced access to
the inputs, technology and social services provided by the collective farm system. As
a result, farm restructuring and individualization ofland use have developed slowly
in countries that issued land shares. For example, in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine,
countries that pursued allocation by land (paper) shares, the proportion ofland in
individual farms has been less than 20%. In Albania and Romania, which pursued
allocation ofland by physical plots, the share ofland in individual farms between 1989
and 2000 increased to almost 90% (Table I).
Resistance to reform can be traced to a variety of factors. In the CIS countries, for
example, there is evidence that some regional authorities not only resisted reforms
because this would have reduced the level of subsidy to the sector, they also resisted
the restructuring of former collectives as they comprised a significant part of their
regional power base. As such, regional authorities used the redistribution of subsidies
and the provision of soft budget constraints at collective farms to shore up support,
whereas agricultural producers preferred the status quo for fear of jeopardizing their
access to subsidies.6 Indeed, defensive motives on the part of incumbents have been
an important part of the story. With few outside opportunities and uncertainty about
future access to land and associated inputs, collective-farm workers and managers have
generally remained passive.
Although such obstacles to agricultural reform have proven formidable in some
countries, they have not been insurmountable. The consequent progress in reform in
Bulgaria, Romania, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine illustrates how shifts in governing
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coalitions to more reform-oriented parties, fiscal crises, as well as external pressure,
can affect policy. Thus, an acute financial and fiscal crisis in Bulgaria in 1996 led to
loss of power by the successor communist party and to the advent of a new government
that was able to implement wide-ranging agricultural reforms. In 1998, faced with
mounting problems in the farming sector, Kazakhstan saw a significant policy shift
in farm restructuring. A combination of repeated write-offs of public sector debts,
the widespread use ofbarter and a severe drought had brought Kazakhstan's farming
sector to the brink of collapse. The government launched a new programme of farm
restructuring based on recognition of the need for extensive application ofbankruptcy
law. In Russia, the combination of strong presidential leadership and a shift in the
balance of power in the Russian State Duma has overcome political opposition to the
2002 Land Law. This new legislation significantly strengthened the right to ownership
of agricultural land and paved the way for the emergence of a land market. Romania
has also made dramatic progress in agricultural reform since 1998, particularly in
improving the public institutions that support the agricultural sector and in privatizing
state-owned agro-processing companies. These reforms have, in part, been set in
motion by the need to fulfil requirements set out in the ED's acquis communautaire
in order to qualify for second-round accession. This external factor has also been
important for some of the advanced reformers in Central and Eastern Europe who have
managed to press through reforms despite the persistence of a conservative rural base.
Comparative politics studies of the former communist countries demonstrate a
positive correlation between democratic systems of governance reflecting the presence of
progressive institutions, and overall economic reform involving stabilization, structural
and institutional reform (De Soto, 2000; Olson, 2000). This can be attributed to the fact
that a greater degree of political openness and a larger number ofchecks on government
power by representative civil society organizations characterize stable democratic
systems. Apart from the conduct of regular elections and political competition, stable
democracies also tend to promote the rule oflaw, free speech and other civil and political
rights. This makes them more likely to be resistant to capture by special (individual or
group) interests that seek to maximize their private benefits. Empirical research suggests
that stable democracies are also better at protecting private property rights and enforcing
contracts, without which farmers face reduced incentives to invest in their land and
improve agricultural productivity (Conning & Robinson, 2001).
Analysis of Spearman correlations between our reform indicators in Table I and
indicators of democratic institutions confirm the pattern discussed above. There
is a strong positive correlation between the degree of reform success in both the
agricultural sector and the overall economy and the five-year (1997-2001) average
measure of democracy taken from the Freedom House database.7 Conversely,
the worst performing transition countries have been those with low measures of
democracy. However, it is also important to note (Table I) that measures of overall
reform - such as the EBRD indicators - are strongly correlated with measures of
reform in agriculture. As such, there is a clear positive association between democratic
institutions and reform in general. The relationships are confirmed by an analysis
of the correlations, using the Freedom House five-year average political governance
indicator. It was found that broad-based multi-party coalitions have generally been the
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more successful ones in implementing and sustaining reform in both the agricultural
sector and the overall economy. Interestingly, as asserted by Mainwaring & Shugart
(1997), this goes against much of the conventional wisdom in the literature, holding
that successful reform has normally been associated with strong executives insulated
from the constraints of political competition and from the compromises that are often
required to sustain coalition governments.8
Methodology and data
The link between institutions, reforms and (labour) productivity in agriculture was
econometrically investigated, focusing on the experiences of the IS former communist
countries listed in Table 1. The main data sources were the national statistics offices,
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), and the World Bank. Comparable agricultural sector annual data
were available over the period 1990-2001. However, no data were available for each
year for all countries, making the panel unbalanced. Clearly, availability of comparable
data limits the set of countries and variables used in our econometric analysis, even
though we used the best aggregate agricultural sector data available.
The productivity growth in agriculture was measured in terms ofgrowth of the
gross agricultural output per worker, GAOW. According to Solow's neo-classical model
it is more appropriate to use per worker than per capita variables, because the model
is based on a production function and not every person from the country's population
contributes to production (Solow, 1956). Contrary to previous empirical studies that
focused on average changes in the early years of transition (e.g., Lerman, 2000; Macours
& Swinnen, 2000a, b), we considered year-to-year changes in GAOW. By calculating the
growth rates in agricultural production per worker for each country at a given point in
time it was possible to demonstrate the high heterogeneity among countries (Table I).
In the Solow model, growth in output per worker depends on the actual output per
worker, q(t), the initial output per worker, q(o) , the initial level of technology, A(o) , the
rate of technological progress, a, the savings/investment rate, s, the growth rate of the
labour force, 1, the depreciation rate, d , the share of capital in output, k , and the rate
of convergence to steady state, C, according to the following equation:
lnq(t) -lnq(o) ~ - (I - e-Ct ) lnq(o) + (I - e-Ct ) InA(o) + at
k k
+ (I - e-Ct ) - In(s) - (I - e-Ct ) - In(l + a + d).
I-k I-k
(I)
The model predicts that a high savings/investment rate will affect growth positively,
whereas a high labour force growth corrected for the rate of technological progress and
the rate of depreciation will have a negative effect on growth.
GAOW was measured in Purchasing Power Parity adjusted US dollars and was
calculated by using the 1990 level of agricultural Gross Domestic Product obtained
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from the EBRD database and the FAO annual output index over the period I990-Z00I.
Due to the lack of any better measure, the savings-investment rate,s, was calculated
as the ratio of output and input agriculture-specific prices. This ratio is a good proxy
for the gross margin that is closely related to the availability of internal funds. Under
conditions of imperfect financial markets and credit constraints the sensitivity of
investment to internal financing has been shown to be high (see e.g., Fazzari et a!.,
1988). The annual data for agricultural labour force are from the countries' national
statistics offices and the International Labour Organization (ILO), the latter being a
more reliable source of agricultural employment data than FAO. The average labour
force growth rate, 1, was computed as the difference between the natural logarithms
of agricultural labour force at the end and beginning of each year. Like in the literature
(e.g., Mankiw et a!., I99z; Islam, 1995; Caselli et a!., 1996), the sum of the natural
logarithm oflabour force growth rate and 0.05 (for constant technological progress and
depreciation rate) was calculated as a proxy for In(l + a + d).
The model was augmented with control variables that represent measures ofgeneral
economic and agricultural reforms as well as the measure of individualization.9 Progress
in general economic reforms, REFORM, was measured as the average of a set ofEBRD
indicators including measures for price and trade liberalization, privatization, and
enterprise restructuring, which capture the extensiveness ofeconomic reforms in several
dimensions.'o The measures of agricultural reform, AGREFORM, were derived from
the World Bank ECA indicators and from own calculations following the World Bank
methodology and using data from national statistics offices. Five components make up
the World Bank ECA index: (I) price and market liberalization, (z) land reform, (3) agro-
processing industry restructuring, (4) rural finance development, and (5) institutional
reform. The extent of farm restructuring was measured as the share of total agricultural
land that is used by individualfarms, INDIVID (ITAL in Table I). Data from the
countries' national statistics offices and Macours & Swinnen (zoooa) were used. The
values of all measures of reform-progress and farm restructuring were expressed in
natural logarithms.
Possible estimation techniques for the model specified in Equation (I) are cross-
section regressions using data averaged over long periods (e.g., Barro, 1991; Mankiw
et a!., I99z; Sala-i-Martin, 1997) or a dynamic panel data approach (e.g., Islam,
1995; Caselli et a!., 1996). Single cross-section growth regressions have several
disadvantages: (I) the time series are reduced to a single mean and not all available
information is used, (z) it is very likely that single cross-section regressions suffer
from omitted variable bias, and (3) one or more of the regressors may be endogenous.
Within a dynamic panel data framework (e.g., Hansen, I98z; Arellano & Bond, 1991) it
is possible to account for unobserved country-specific effects and allow for endogeneity
of the regressors. II The panel data model takes the following form:
(z)
314
where gil denotes the growth rate of GAOW for country i (i ~ 1,... ,1) at time t (t ~ z, ... ,7),
qil-I is the logarithm of the level of GAOW at the beginning of each period, and Xii is
a vector of regressors such as investment rate and employment growth, following the
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Solow model. Furthermore, as in most empirical studies that are based on more general
models a range of measures of reform was included. The time-invariant unobserved
country-specific effects and the random error term are denoted Vit and Cit> respectively.
Using Equation (2) the dynamic panel data model was rewritten as:
which then becomes
where f3!' ~ (f3 + I).
In estimating Equation (3) the issue of how to treat time-invariant country-specific
characteristics such as initial conditions, inherent institutions, and type ofland reform
adopted, was explicitly addressed. If measured time-invariant country characteristics, wi'
are included in the analysis, Equation (3) becomes:
However, the measured country-specific characteristics, wi ' may be correlated with
the unobserved country-specific effects, vi ' or the error term, Cit. In order to address
inconsistency problems due to (I) omitted unobserved time-invariant country effects
(Hsiao, 1986), (2) small number of time periods, T (Nickell, 1981), or (3) correlations
between regressors and vi and/or Cit the first-difference GMM-IV estimator was
applied. Thus, Equation (3) was estimated without including the measured country-
specific characteristics, wi' i.e., vi'"~ OWi + vi was substituted for vi.'2
In the first-difference equation, under standard assumptions, the instrument set
consists oflags of the dependent variable as well as right-hand-side regressors. Values
of qit lagged two periods or more are valid instruments because %t-2 and earlier values
are generally correlated with L'l.qit-I but not with L'l.cit. If the regressors, Xit ' are strictly
exogenous (E[XitCipJ ~ 0 for all p, t) then all past, present and future values of Xit are
valid instruments in the first-difference equation, even if the Xit are correlated with vi'
However, it is likely that some of the regressors in our model, e.g., policies or policy
outcomes (capital and labour reallocation rates as well as shares of individual farming),
were not strictly exogenous. There may be a feedback mechanism where past shocks
to productivity are correlated with current policies or outcomes. Following Arellano &
Bond (1991) we then used values of the predetermined Xit lagged one period or more
as valid instruments in the first-difference equation. If a regressor is endogenous we
have to allow for correlation between the current value of this regressor and current
shocks to productivity, as well as for feedback from past shocks to productivity. In that
case, valid instruments in the first-difference equation are values of the endogenous Xit
lagged two periods or more.
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Estimation results
The results of GMM-IV estimations based on the neoclassical growth model have been
summarized in Table 2. The estimated equations are log-linear so that the estimated
coefficients of all explanatory variables can be interpreted as elasticities. The left-hand-
side variable is the change in the logarithm of gross agricultural output per worker
(GAOW). All regressions included time dummies (not shown, just like the constant),
which in all regressions were found to be jointly significant. There was no second-
order serial correlation (the m 2 -test) and the Sargan test did not reject the validity of
instruments in all specifications.
First, a regression corresponding to the textbook Solow model was run [Table 2,
column (I)]. All variables are statistically significant (P < 0.01) and have the expected
signs. The negative regression coefficient on initial GAOW - as in most published
work - is interpreted as conditional convergence, where investment has a positive
and growth oflabour force a negative impact as suggested by the Solow model.'3 The
implied rate of convergence to steady state (C) was about 7% per annum, which is quite
high but not surprising for the case of economic transition. It appears that the most
important determinant of growth in agricultural (labour) productivity is the reduction
in excess labour, which is interpreted as an indicator of passive restructuring whereas
active restructuring is defined as new investment (Coricelli & Djankov, 2001).
Next, regressions augmented with measures of progress in agricultural and general
economic reforms and in individualization of agricultural production were run to
assess the effects on productivity growth. In column (2) ofTable 2 the results are
presented of the Solow model augmented with a measure of general economic reforms
(REFORM). The results of the base regression hold, as the coefficient of the reform
variable is statistically significant (P < 0.05) and positive as expected. REFORM is a
synthetic indicator of policy outcomes and reform policies adopted, measuring the
advancement in general economic reforms. Like in other studies it is interpreted as an
important condition for successful restructuring of the agricultural sector (Lerman,
2000; 2001; Macours & Swinnen, 2000a, b), recognizing that the impact of reforms is
affected by policy choices and initial conditions.'4
Individualization of agricultural production is an important indicator of restructuring
agriculture. It is the major outcome of the agriculture-specific reform policies adopted.
The importance ofland reform policies lies with the fact that they have resulted in
different magnitudes of the shift ofland to individual farms (INDIVID). So by assessing
the impact of individualization on (labour) productivity growth we provided an implicit
evaluation of the success ofland reform policies adopted. The results from augmenting
the Solow model with INDIVID [Table 2, column (3)] show that individualization was
important for (labour) productivity growth. With respect to both sign and magnitude,
the regression coefficients for the base variables are as in previous model specifications,
whereas the coefficient of the individualization variable is positive and statistically
significant (P < 0.01). This result is important because we found a positive effect of
individualization, using a dynamic model controlling investment and changes in the
labour force, which were very important factors of the agricultural sector transformation
during the period of analysis.
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Table 2. GMM-IV regression coefficients] with standard errors 2 (in parentheses) of augmented Solow
models of gross agricultural output per worker for 15 former communist countries (n ~ I02).
Variable Dependent variable (GAOw )
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base model + REFORM + INDIVID +AGREFORM + (REFORM+INDIVID
+AGREFORM)
In (qt-I) -0.0699 *** 3 -0. 0830 *** -0.II80 *** -0.1205 *** -0.1515 ***
(0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0182) (0.0208) (0.0274)
In (s) 0.II59 *** 0.15 87 *** 0.1514 *** 0.15 20 *** 0.1576 **
(0.03 6 9) (0.0357) (0.0335) (0.0339) (0.033 0 )
In (l+a+d) -0.6957 *** -0.6793 *** -0.7236 *** -0·7379 ** -0·7774 **
(0.1339) (0.1244) (0.1201) (0.1215) (0.1256 )
In REFORM 0.0685 ** 0.0660 *
(0.0319) (0.0334)
In INDIVID 0.0599 *** 0.0475 **
(0.0228) (0.0220)
InAGREFORM 0.0620 ** 0.0551 ns
(0.0306 ) (0.03 83)
------------
Tests 4
m] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m 2 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.15
Sargan 0.88 0.96 0.90 0.91 0.9 0
] Coefficients represent elasticities.
2 Standard errors are robust to general heteroskedasticity.
3 Statistical significance. ns ~ not statistically significant; * ~ P < O.IO; ** ~ P < 0.05; *** ~ P < O.Or.
4 P-values of the null hypothesis.
The results of the impact of agricultural reform (AGREFORM) on productivity growth
[Table 2, column (4)] are similar to the results in column (2) where the effect of
general economic reform was estimated. The levels of statistical significance of the
effects are also similar. It was interesting, however, to assess whether AGREFORM
had an independent impact on growth or whether it was purely a proxy for success in
general economic reforms. So we tested for interdependence of effects in the following
specification where all the measures of reform were included.IS
In Table 2 [column (s)] the results from the Solow model specification augmented
with both measures of reform (REFORM and AGREFORM) and INDIVID are presented.
Again the results from the base specification were maintained and the impact ofboth
REFORM and INDIVID was positive and statistically significant. It is noteworthy
that the significance (at conventional levels) ofAGREFORM disappeared suggesting
that individualization ofland use was the most important component ofagricultural
reforms. Furthermore, other agricultural reform components reflect the impact of
general economic reform - a result in line with findings by Rizov (2ooSb). The rate of
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convergence to steady state (q more than doubled when both economic reforms and
restructuring offarms through individualization had been implemented. This result is
robust to alternative treatments ofINDIVID as exogenous or endogenous.
Previous studies (Macours & Swinnen, 2000a, b; Falcetti et a!., 2002) have
emphasized the importance of initial conditions in determining performance during
transition. Their results show that the impact of initial conditions was stronger with
respect to gross output whereas it was weak with respect to labour productivity.
In a similar manner a test for the impact of country-specific initial conditions on
productivity growth was conducted in a second (auxiliary) step of our analysis.
Keeping in mind the caveats made earlier about possible inconsistency of second-step
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates we analysed relationships by using Spearman
correlations. For our purpose this approach is sufficient to shed light on a relationship
where the magnitude of correlation is of main interest, as causality is known a priory.
The country-specific characteristics were measured, using two synthetic indices that
summarize a number ofvariables describing the inherent institutional and economic
conditions in the former communist countries at the beginning of transition.r6 The
first index can be interpreted as a measure of inherited distortions and institutional
constraints. The second initial-conditions index reflects the degree of development
of the economy. When correlating each index with either actual (labour) productivity
growth or with the residuals of productivity growth estimates from the specification
in Table 2 [column (5)] no statistically significant relationships (r < 0.2) were found.
Correlations were also calculated with the Freedom House measures of democracy and
governance as discussed earlier, instead of the initial condition indices. However, again
no statistically significant relationships were found. This may suggest that the main
impact of initial conditions and institutions that they embody is indirect and channelled
via the choice of reform policies, as argued earlier.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper aimed to explain the heterogeneity in performance of agricultural sectors
in IS former communist countries. The analysis specifically focused on (labour)
productivity growth as a measure of performance and on the importance of reform
policy choices largely determined by inherent institutions. The main conclusion, i.e.,
that individualization ofland use accompanied by a successful general (as opposed to
agriculture-specific) economic reform positively affects (labour) productivity growth,
is robust to alternative treatments with respect to endogeneity assumptions. The
advantage of the approach is that the relationship was analysed within the well-defined
theoretical framework of the augmented neoclassical growth model. Furthermore,
when panel data and a GMM-IV first-difference estimator were used, consistent
regression coefficient estimates were obtained by controlling for endogeneity and
unobserved country-specific effects.
The results of the paper have a number of important policy implications. First,
it was confirmed that agricultural policy aiming at individualization of agricultural
land use leads to (labour) productivity growth. Second, reducing excess labour and
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increasing investment, which are associated with passive and active restructuring,
respectively, were found to be very important determinants of the (labour) productivity
growth in former communist countries' agriculture. Third, general economic reforms
positively affected (labour) productivity growth whereas differences in initial conditions
did not have an important (direct) impact during the first ten years of transition. As
discussed, initial conditions and particularly inherent institutions appeared to have
significantly affected reform policy choices and outcomes. Furthermore, on the basis
of our econometric analysis and the discussions throughout this paper, one can
reasonably argue that success in agricultural transition is strongly correlated with
advancement in general economic reform, which appeared to be a very important
condition for (labour) productivity growth in agriculture.
The general results reported in this paper are in agreement with the findings of
studies that used more recent and extended samples of aggregate data (e.g., Falcetti et
a!., 2006) or micro-data generated from household and farm surveys (e.g., Swinnen &
Vranken, 2006; Feng, 2008). Main finding of Falcetti et a!. (2006) was the positive and
significant link between progress in market-oriented reforms and cumulative growth
in a sample of 27 transition countries, even though their analysis was not specifically
aimed at agriculture. Falcetti et a!. (2006) also confirmed the already established result
that the importance of initial conditions as a determinant of growth had declined
over time. Interestingly, factors such as stabilization and oil prices were also found
to affect growth to some extent but they did not mitigate the importance of reforms,
which is similar to our findings. In a study specifically aimed at agriculture, Swinnen
& Vranken (2006) calculated farm-level efficiency indicators for five East European
countries and linked the indicators to various measures of reforms over the period
1997-2001. For these five countries they found a positive correlation both between
the advancement of reforms and productivity in agriculture, and between the share
of efficient agricultural producers and the stages of reform. Feng (2008) estimated
the technical efficiency in rice production and examined the effect ofland rental
market participation and off-farm employment on efficiency in rural China during the
period 2000-2003. Again, the general finding was that technical efficiency improved
when reforms were implemented that facilitated participation in land renting and
development of individual farming.
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Notes
I The analysis in this paper covers 15 former communist countries: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine. The reason for including these countries in the sample is twofold.
First, availability of comparable data limits the set of countries. Second, with respect to agricultural
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transition most of the former Soviet Union countries can be grouped together, so that using data from
the four largest countries allows us to form a reliable picture of the agricultural transition in the region
(Lerman, 2004; Rozelle & Swinnen, 2004). Specifically, similar to Belarus only in Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan private ownership ofland has not yet been recognized. Physical distribution of farmland
on an equal per capita basis to farm workers or rural households, similar to the process in Albania, is
very rare and occurred only in Armenia and Georgia. Most former Soviet Union countries fall into the
intermediate reformer group that includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia. The group of slow reformers - Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan - is characterized by autocratic regimes with weak or non-existent civil societies, frail
democratic institutions and highly centralized political power. In this group of countries private property
rights are very limited. For detailed classification of the countries with respect to progress in agricultural
transition see Anon. (2002).
2 Agriculture in Poland and Slovenia was already based on individual farms and private ownership or
usufruct rights prior to the reform (Swinnen, 1999).
3This is the most important method ofland reform in the CIS countries. In addition, outsiders who were
not entitled to land shares could receive land for private farming from a special state reserve established for
this purpose covering IS to 20% oftotal agricultural land (Lerman et aI., 2004).
4 Our approach follows advances in the mainstream growth modelling literature and is an improvement on
previous agriculture-specific studies. There are several previous aggregate country studies of agricultural
sector performance that apply pooled or cross-section regressions (Lerman, 2000; 2001; Macours &
Swinnen, 2000a, b). There are also several studies analysing technical or total factor productivity across
farm types but only in a few transition countries and using only partially representative data (e.g., Mathijs
& Swinnen, 2001); Gorton & Davidova (2004) offer a review of such studies.
5 The analysis is inspired, in part, by the recent literature on varieties of capitalism (VoC) represented
by Hall & Soskice (2001) amongst others. Institutional complementarity is a key concept ofthe VoC
perspective. Specifically, for the case of agricultural transition and accession to the EU, Slangen et al.
(2004), following ideas in the spirit ofVoC, point to the need of complementarity between protection
ofprivate property, freedom of exchange, trust, consistency in monitoring environmental laws , and
governments that act neutrally and are not corrupt, in order the transition process to succeed.
6 Bezlepkina et al. (2005) studied the effect of subsidies on the dairy producers in the Moscow region
and found a low responsiveness to market signals. They also found that subsidies have a distorting effect
on the input-output mix. At the same time the study shows that subsidies relieve the credit constraints
on dairy farms and have an important positive influence on short-term farm profit.
7 Freedom House (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page~I>)was founded in 1941 by
Eleanor Roosevelt and other prominent individuals concerned with the mounting threats to peace and
democracy. Freedom House is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that through a vast array of
international programmes and publications is working to advance the worldwide expansion ofpolitical
and economic freedom.
8 Performing similar analyses of correlations between the reform indicators and two synthetic indices
of initial conditions, one measuring inherent distortions and institutional constraints and the other the
degree of development of the economy (see further), also confirms the positive relationship between
success in reforms and good inherent institutions.
9 Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) augment the Solow model with investment in
human capital as an additional determinant of growth in output per worker. Note that the variables that
we use measure the progress in reforms and reflect the impact of changes due to reform policies.
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10 See Chapter 2 ofthe EBRD Transition Report (Anon., 2002) for detailed definitions ofthese indicators.
II Arellano & Bond (1991) suggest a first difference GMM-IV estimator and Blundell & Bond (1998)
improve the performance of the estimator by extending the instrument set used. An alternative approach
to estimate productivity (at firm level) suggested by Olley & Pakes (1996) deals with both simultaneity
and selection biases due to the presence of unobservable heterogeneity across firms. However, the
GMM-IV estimator is more appropriate in cases where the impacts of several endogenous variables are
estimated and selection does not play an important role.
12 In order to evaluate the impact of country-specific observed characteristics on GAOW that are
eliminated from the first-difference equation a second step estimation can be added up, similarly
to Blanchflower et al. (1996) and Battese & Coelli (1995). The consistent GMM estimates from the
first-difference equation are used to calculate the residuals of Equation (3). In the second step these
residuals are regressed on the measured country-specific characteristics, wi' The ordinary least squares
levels estimation of the second-stage equation generates a consistent coefficient estimate if all wi
characteristics are uncorrelated with vi, which is a strong assumption and we treat such estimates
with caution. The estimation results, which show no statistically significant impact of wi on (labour)
productivity growth, can be obtained from the author upon request.
I) Results reported are under the assumption that all right-hand-site variables are predetermined.
Versions of the regressions where investment and growth in labour force are assumed endogenous were
also run but the results were not statistically different. The results from these alternative treatments are
available upon request.
14 In a second (auxiliary) step of the analysis direct correlations between initial conditions and
productivity were further explored. However no statistically significant relationships were found.
15 In a base specification augmented only with REFORM and AGREFORM variables we found that the
statistical significance (at conventional levels, P < o.ra) ofAGREFORM disappears. A similar result
with respectto the significance of AGREFORM is also observed in a specification augmented with
AGREFORM and INDIVID. The regression results are available upon request.
16 The indices are based on a principal component analysis. See the Technical Note to Chapter 4 of the
EBRD Transition Report (Anon., 2002) for more details.
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